The good, the bad, and the ugly of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to mobilize $1.3 trillion to support climate action in developing countries.

With COP30 just days away in Belém, Brazil, the Brazilian and Azerbaijani presidencies responsible for designing the Baku to Belém Roadmap to mobilize at least $1.3 trillion have finally published an 81-page document. The long-awaited Roadmap has generated expectations, not only because it is the agreed path to go from the $300 billion agreed at COP29 to the $1.3 trillion (aspirational goal), but also because it represents the commitment and signals that the system is still committed to supporting the actions of developing countries, above all, to achieve the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Policies (NAPs), among other relevant instruments.

Photo: Rafa Neddermeyer/COP30

The document, which has a structure very similar to the document produced by the so-called Circle of Ministers coordinated by the Brazilian Ministry of Finance, has some positive aspects, some negative aspects, and some that should not have been included at all.  

The good:

• Diversity of instruments: it refers to the importance of mobilizing a diversity of instruments, recognizing the importance of debt relief and expanding fiscal space so as not to further affect developing countries.
  

• Inclusion of critical thematic areas: it recognizes the importance of adaptation as an important area, also acknowledging the issue of loss and damage, in addition to listing other key sectors such as forests, oceans, agriculture, and mountain ecosystems, all of which require specific and different financial treatment, introducing some measures.
  

• Recognition of the vulnerability of islands and least developed countries: the various sections of the Roadmap recognize the high vulnerability of island countries and least developed countries, but do not always mention all the regions that make up the global south, such as those in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.
  

• Local capacities, readiness mechanisms, and project preparation: The Roadmap discusses the importance of continuing to strengthen countries' capacities to access financing and the importance of readiness programs for this purpose, including the preparation of proposals, which have been some of the most important demands of developing countries. 
  

• Strengthening local financial institutions such as National Development Banks (NDBs): The importance of strengthening national financial institutions, such as development banks, and how they can better coordinate with institutions such as multilateral development banks and others is discussed.
  

• Climate and nature synergies:  Emphasizes the importance of working on interconnections such as synergies between climate and nature conventions, in addition to other thematic agendas, which would facilitate coordination processes in developing countries, if there is no double counting of financing.
  

• Vision for the future: despite the repeated message that the Roadmap is not a negotiating element within COP30, the presidencies included a series of possible options to further strengthen the path opened by this document, allowing us to envisage a scenario that goes beyond the COP itself.  
  

Although several points included allow for a forward-looking vision, the Roadmap has many other elements that make it a document with little transformative power, resulting in a repetition of failed measures.

The bad:

• Weak call to fulfill the obligations of developed countries: while the Roadmap stems from Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which calls on developed countries to take the lead in providing and mobilizing finance, the Roadmap refers to bilateral cooperation as a minor element, leaving aside the possibility of creating stronger, more transparent, and more predictable commitments for this finance from the public budgets of developed countries, which is what gives predictability to other types of instruments.
  

• Partial treatment of debt: despite recognizing the debt crisis as a major barrier for developing countries, the Roadmap limits itself to considering debt sustainability mechanisms, rather than appropriate treatment according to the conditions of each country, which in some cases will require cancellations, in others there will be opportunities for change, and only in a few will there be possibilities for making it sustainable. This is without mentioning that it does not discuss the possibility of creating a more robust apparatus to address the debt issue beyond the voluntary activities presented in the Seville Platform.
  

• Critical role of multilateral development banks, but with a vague call for attention: the importance of the role of MDBs as key actors of change and mobilization is stated, but vague measures for their structural reform are included, not to mention that it is suggested that only by improving transparency will institutions achieve the major actions that are required. The call to MDBs is weak and suggests a "business as usual" trajectory for them.
  

• Adaptation in narrative, but not in proposals: it attempts to list a series of measures, including those for key sectors such as adaptation, but it sticks to short-range measures to achieve resource scalability, leaving the issue of adaptation as mere narrative rather than at the center of the objectives. This is because it does not present clear, diverse, and cross-cutting proposals to ensure that financing is fair, accessible, and in the form of grants for adaptation, leaving philanthropy with the message that it should be the one to address this issue.
  

• Call to improve access, without measures to achieve it: it is recognized that access to financing is another key issue in the poor quality of financing, but it does not clearly indicate the need to create schemes or windows of access for the most vulnerable populations, such as indigenous communities, Afro-descendants, youth, women, children, and other vulnerable groups. While harmonizing processes helps, the problem is that there are no facilities for vulnerable populations.
  

• Increasing effectiveness without impact measures: Although it calls for increased effectiveness as a key part of future actions, it does not integrate the need to generate differentiated impact measures to ensure that financing not only comes and is provided in an appropriate manner, but is also allocated through the appropriate means to achieve the appropriate impact, which must be differentiated in terms of mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, but also by population segments, women, men, and other aspects.
  

• Limited options for increasing climate finance, no call to reduce high-carbon investments: the roadmap refers to limited measures to actually mobilize climate finance. The biggest gap is that it fails to mention the reduction of carbon-intensive investments as an effective, clear, and perhaps unique way to increase the efficiency and impact of climate finance.
  

• Expanding fiscal space in the narrative, but not in the proposals: the roadmap discusses the importance of expanding countries' fiscal space, but does not include concrete measures to support this process, nor does it refer to other ongoing processes such as the Fiscal Convention, which should be linked to the medium- and long-term process.

• Measures for transparency but not to end greenwashing: it is recognized that measures such as the implementation of an interoperable framework for the implementation of sustainable taxonomies and the creation of more transparency schemes for the private sector will help to mobilize more of this capital . However, it lacks proposals to regulate and end greenwashing by companies, and avoids addressing the necessary mandatory nature of these schemes to ensure long-term success. 
  

These are just some of the measures that make the Roadmap somewhat transformative, but there are perhaps three other measures that should not be included in it for any reason. The ugly:

• Accounting for remittances: it is clear that developing countries will need all kinds of resources to increase their climate finance, but counting all the resources generated by countries is not associated with the responsibilities of developed countries to provide finance. Perhaps it can be related to making all flows compatible with low-carbon development, but that is associated with Article 2.1.c and not with the Roadmap.
  

• Integration of measures that do not contribute to low-carbon development at their root: the integration of measures such as carbon capture and storage has been highly questioned due to their inability to transform development trajectories. However, the Roadmap integrates them as areas of investment, which should not be considered.
  

• Integration of market mechanisms as a source of financing: Market mechanisms are discussed as one of the sources of financing, despite the fact that it has been argued that these resources should not be mixed, because not all developing countries have access to these mechanisms, which have also not proven to be effective in reducing emissions.

In general, the Roadmap confuses actions to support developing countries with actions to transform all financing flows. In other words, it confuses the origin and purpose of Article 9, which focuses on supporting developing countries, with Article 2.1.c, which is dedicated to transforming all financing flows. This is a central flaw in the narrative and integration of the document.

A major flaw is that it fails to make the necessary connections, both within and outside the Convention, which makes the Roadmap a visionless instrument.

The future

Given that the Roadmap lacks tangible and transformative responses associated with the needs of all developing countries, as many of the alternatives may be true in some emerging country contexts but not in all developing countries, what can be done is to agree on some steps forward:

1.       Accept the Roadmap as a first effort, but set a maximum period of one year for its review and integration of tangible actions to move towards the real mobilization of financing with the characteristics included in the Roadmap's mandate, in collaboration and coordination with the parties and entities observing the process. This will require a major diplomatic effort on the part of Brazil to work with countries on the adoption of this document as a critical element of COP30.

2.       Mandate the Standing Committee on Finance to conduct a detailed review of the elements of the Roadmap, as part of the follow-up to the decision on the new target, but integrating a mandate that addresses the review of both quantitative and qualitative aspects, to avoid a report that does not allow for course correction.

3.       Mandate that the new climate finance target and the Roadmap take into account and connect with other processes within and outside the Convention, so that it marks a path of connection and not a parallel path that is independent and disconnected from the processes.

Many of us have invested time in this process because we believe it can be transformative, but in the wrong hands it can be a barrier to progress.

This is a call to Brazil, and to all countries, to work together to make this Roadmap the path we need to scale up fair, sustainable, and truly transformative financing.